OPINION — In 2016, I sat throughout the desk from China’s Director of Operations for the Ministry of State Safety (MSS). Their go to to Kabul was tightly scripted, talking solely from ready paperwork, with translators available, and by no means deviating from the road. The assembly was a part of a broader intelligence dialogue between the MSS and Afghanistan’s Nationwide Directorate of Safety (NDS), which I led on the time.
Their concern was centered and unyielding: the presence of Uyghur militants affiliated with the East Turkestan Islamic Motion (ETIM) in Afghanistan. Whereas our engagement was primarily with the Ministry of State Safety (MSS)—China’s civilian intelligence service—it’s vital to notice that different Chinese language intelligence components have been additionally current and lively in Afghanistan. These included PLA navy intelligence officers (beforehand often known as 2PLA), working beneath diplomatic cowl and conducting parallel HUMINT efforts.
That engagement was only one instance of how China quietly however assertively embeds intelligence affect in creating nations. Whereas Beijing’s actions could also be framed as counterterrorism cooperation or financial engagement, the deeper sample reveals a calculated grey zone technique—working beneath the edge of open battle by way of long-term penetration and affect—which deserves shut scrutiny as U.S.-China competitors escalates globally.
From Economics to Intelligence in Afghanistan
Within the 2000s, China’s Afghan presence was commercially pushed. The $3 billion Mes Aynak copper mine contract mirrored its resource-focused technique. Intelligence assortment remained passive, primarily routed by way of business and diplomatic channels.
However after 2014, Beijing’s calculus shifted. The emergence of ISIS and the rising presence of Uyghur militants in northeastern Afghanistan—significantly Badakhshan Province, which borders China’s Xinjiang area—prompted MSS to take extra direct motion. China feared that ETIM fighters fleeing battle zones, usually by way of Turkey, have been regrouping close to its border.
Chinese language intelligence officers, together with these from the MSS and the PLA’s navy intelligence, expanded its footprint contained in the Chinese language Embassy in Kabul and commenced concentrating on native Afghan influencers—particularly Members of Parliament from affected provinces. These officers have been invited to “holidays” in China, the place they have been supplied money, hosted with care, and requested to share intelligence about their areas. Their relations have been supplied scholarships and Chinese language-language schooling. MSS leveraged these officers to focus on provincial governors, police commanders, and neighborhood leaders for additional affect.
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Partaking the NDS: A Partnership with Limits
Ultimately, MSS sought formal engagement with the Afghan intelligence neighborhood. Initially cautious because of our shut relationships with the CIA and different Western companies, the Chinese language approached each the Workplace of the President and senior NDS officers. Excessive-ranking Chinese language delegations, together with Politburo members and MSS deputy administrators, visited Kabul and opened dialogue.
Their major curiosity was not in Afghanistan’s broader stability or democracy—it was in neutralizing ETIM.
In 2016, we established a joint counterterrorism unit: eight MSS officers working alongside a dozen Afghan case officers and analysts. Whereas the collaboration was framed as mutual, Chinese language officers have been assertive and fixated. They’d repeatedly push intelligence companions to deal with particular targets, usually elevating the identical names in conferences with senior Afghan and even U.S. officers.
MSS supplied technical assist to NDS, significantly in indicators intelligence (SIGINT), which comprised 80% of our uncooked intelligence. Whereas this assist got here by way of MSS channels, it’s doubtless that PLA cyber and indicators models—beforehand often known as 3PLA and now a part of the PLA’s Info Assist Power—have been additionally concerned behind the scenes or in an advising capability. Our evaluation discovered MSS prioritized studying NDS’s capabilities over bettering them. We rejected affords of apparatus and delicate technical support and stored our digital infrastructure tightly compartmentalized.
China’s intelligence structure is multilayered. Along with the Ministry of State Safety (MSS), companies such because the Individuals’s Liberation Military (PLA) Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Employees Division (previously often known as 2PLA), the PLA’s Our on-line world Power and Info Assist Power (previously 3PLA), and the Political Work Division of the Central Navy Fee (beforehand the Basic Political Division Liaison Workplace, or GPDLO) every conduct abroad intelligence, HUMINT, and affect operations—usually beneath diplomatic, journalistic, or business cowl. This complexity usually goes unnoticed however is central to understanding China’s grey zone actions.
China’s Strategic Apathy Towards the Republic
Not like a lot of Afghanistan’s companions, China demonstrated little interest in preserving the Afghan Republic. Because the U.S.-Taliban peace talks superior and President Biden’s withdrawal plan crystallized, MSS confirmed no concern for institutional continuity. As a substitute, they accelerated covert outreach to Taliban factions—replicating their northeast technique of help, relationship-building, and focused intelligence requests.
Chinese language intelligence companies continued to deal with ETIM. Whereas the MSS was the first interlocutor, different entities reportedly supplied technical coaching and surveillance assist to the Taliban’s Basic Directorate of Intelligence (GDI). Following the Taliban’s takeover, former Afghan SIGINT officers reported observing Chinese language technicians inspecting GDI’s indicators intelligence infrastructure—elevating issues about potential Chinese language entry to post-Republic techniques. This rising alignment now extends past Kabul into Afghanistan’s strategic peripheries.
In Badakhshan province Chinese language firms are working mining tasks in districts resembling Shignan, Shahre Bozorg, Raghha, and Yaftal Payen. Introduced as financial growth, these tasks let Chinese language intelligence surveil border zones and observe Uyghur militants. The mining operations doubtless serve twin functions: useful resource extraction and the embedding of ahead intelligence belongings beneath the quilt of business engagement.
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Past Afghanistan: A International Grey Zone Sample
Afghanistan is way from an outlier. China’s intelligence and affect playbook extends broadly throughout the creating world, leveraging financial presence as a key software for long-term strategic penetration in what can greatest be described as grey zone competitors.
Pakistan affords a important case examine. Having lived there as a refugee from 1988 to 2001, I witnessed firsthand how China advanced from an financial associate to a deep intelligence and protection collaborator. All through the Nineteen Eighties and Nineties, China steadily deepened its function in Pakistani infrastructure, protection, and nuclear growth—considerably strengthening Islamabad’s strategic posture towards India. This relationship has since matured into a sturdy intelligence and navy alliance.
Chinese language applied sciences, together with surveillance platforms and drones, have reportedly been deployed in current Indo-Pakistani confrontations—marking their first use in dwell regional battle. In the meantime, Pakistan’s heavy dependence on Chinese language funding by way of the China-Pakistan Financial Hall (CPEC) has facilitated deeper Chinese language Intelligence entrenchment, disguised as safety cooperation.
This sample extends past Asia. In Africa, Huawei’s surveillance techniques in nations like Uganda allow Chinese language intelligence entry, whereas in Latin America, Peru’s Chancay port conceals Chinese language intelligence operations, very similar to Afghanistan’s mining tasks. Investments usually conceal surveillance and intelligence. This covert encroachment threatens state sovereignty, undermines alliances, and calls for a complete U.S.-led response to counter China’s grey zone technique.
Strategic Classes for the USA
China’s engagement with creating nations is just not all the time adversarial. In some circumstances, its presence has contributed to regional boards, infrastructure growth, and even safety coordination. Nevertheless it’s additionally rigorously calculated. Chinese language intelligence companies don’t function randomly—they aim areas of strategic concern, construct long-term leverage, and prioritize affect over ideology.
The USA ought to keep away from dismissing these efforts as mere financial opportunism. When the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan, it left behind a vacuum that China shortly stuffed—not solely by way of business exercise, however by embedding Chinese language intelligence affect inside Taliban intelligence.
This sample is just not distinctive to Afghanistan. Primarily based on firsthand expertise with how China operates covertly beneath the banner of financial engagement, it’s extremely doubtless that comparable affect operations are unfolding in different nations the place Chinese language funding and growth tasks are increasing. The U.S. should take a extra proactive method—scrutinizing Chinese language actions past simply commerce and tariffs—and develop a clearer understanding of how China embeds intelligence and affect networks in fragile or strategically vital nations.
America nonetheless has leverage. Tons of of hundreds of Afghans have been educated by way of U.S. navy, academic, and governance applications. This younger diaspora represents a future democratic pressure. Relatively than cede the bottom, Washington ought to assist the formation of a reputable Afghan opposition—one which displays the desire of the Afghan folks and preserves their connections to the democratic world.
China’s intelligence companies have mastered the artwork of quiet affect. What begins as financial cooperation evolves into deep-rooted intelligence presence—usually with out the host nation absolutely realizing the shift. In Afghanistan and past, Chinese language intelligence has efficiently positioned itself to safe Beijing’s pursuits whereas eroding U.S. affect.
Understanding—and countering—this technique requires not simply vigilance, however a long-term funding in allies, civil society, and the data area within the creating world.
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